Implementation of a low-cost Interim 21CFR11 compliance solution for laboratory environments by Greene , Jack E.
Implementation of a low-cost Interim
21CFR11 compliance solution for
laboratory environmentsy
Jack E. Greene*
Alkermes, Inc., 88 Sidney Street, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
In the recent past, compliance with 21CFR11 has become a major
buzzword within the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.
While commercial solutions exist, implementation and validation
are expensive and cumbersome. Frequent implementation of new
features via point releases further complicates purchasing deci-
sions by making it diﬃcult to weigh the risk of non-compliance
against the costs of too frequent upgrades. This presentation
discusses a low-cost interim solution to the problem. While this
solution does not address 100% of the issues raised by 21CFR11,
it does implement and validate: (1) computer system security;
(2) backup and restore ability on the electronic records store; and
(3) an automated audit trail mechanism that captures the date,
time and user identiﬁcation whenever electronic records are created,
modiﬁed or deleted. When coupled with enhanced procedural
controls, this solution provides an acceptable level of compliance
at extremely low cost.
Introduction
In 1997, the FDA enacted 21CFR11. This rule intro-
duced additional requirements surrounding the use and
storage of electronic records and electronic signatures for
all systems regulated by the US Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act.
The electronic records portion of this act can be inter-
preted in light of the way that traditional paper records
were maintained before the use of electronic systems
became ubiquitous.
Historical comparison
How laboratory raw data was collected in 1980
The most common form of laboratory data collection was
onto paper records. Data was handwritten onto sequen-
tially numbered worksheets/notebook pages or were
written by instruments onto chart recorders. Instruments
were set up and run by adjusting dials or keypads on the
front panels.
How laboratory raw data was managed in 1980
Analysts wrote in notebooks with numbered, sewn
pages or on sequentially numbered, logged worksheets
and were trained to sign and date their work directly.
Data deletions were obvious because a numbered page
would need to be removed and destroyed, which would
be obvious in any audit. On occasion where data was
incorrect and required changing, analysts lined out the
data such that the original data was not obscured. They
then initialled the line out with a date, initials and
justiﬁcation for change.
How laboratory raw data is collected today
With the advent of high-speed computer hardware
and software, laboratory systems have changed. Most
equipment is run from a PC interface, and in many
cases, operation without the PC is not possible. Data is
collected onto the PC hard drive and processed and
manipulated using software packages. In cases where
these systems are connected to networks, data may be
saved onto servers or LIMS systems.
How laboratory raw data is managed today
Analyst raw data is saved directly to hard drives. If data
is to be signed and dated, they need to print out a
hardcopy. Data deletions are diﬃcult to detect because
PC hard drives are diﬃcult to audit. Data can be
manipulated in both raw and processed form multiple
times. In most cases, there is no way to detect this activity
from the printout. Data can be copied and circulated
such that it is diﬃcult to determine which copy is
authoritative.
The FDA is trying to maintain the same level of control
over electronic records as was the case for paper records.
Issues
There are some physical and logical security issues to
solve such as limiting access to laboratory instruments as
well as to laboratory raw data.
There are audit trail issues to solve centering around
a mechanism to track when data is created, altered,
deleted, by whom, and on what date and time.
There are revision control issues to solve. If data becomes
modiﬁed, how can previous versions be retrieved?
Commercial solutions
Most of the common solutions of these issues involve the
use of a database. If data resides in databases, these
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69systems can be used to manage version control as well
as to provide audit trails. Users can log into databases
that can enforce access rights that prevent deletions or
modiﬁcations.
The core issues with all these systems centres around cost
and ﬂexibility. LIMS systems are expensive to purchase,
diﬃcult to conﬁgure and frequently limit how users use
their systems. The validation eﬀort on these systems is an
entire separate undertaking with large amounts of work
and associated costs.
Alternative solutions
Networked operating systems can be used to provide a
good level of physical and logical data security. If this is
coupled with limited physical access and procedural
controls, the overall solution can meet the needs of
21CFR11 including:
. Centralized access control list that applies to all
computers on the laboratory network.
. Centralized password policy and account lockout.
. Prevent unauthorized users from gaining access.
. Allow for network-based data store.
. User groups by functional area with login
restriction.
. Minimum password length and uniqueness.
. Passwordageing,minimumandmaximumpassword
change times.
. Account lockout for too many failed login attempts.
While this schema solves the security issues relatively
well, is has serious issues in the area of version control.
If the operating system is the user interface to the instru-
ment and its raw data, there is a rule of thumb: if users
have the permission to save data, they also have the
permission to modify or delete data. While this is not
absolute, it holds in most cases.
This issue can be tackled using some basic IT tools. If
data is not located on the local computer hard drive, then
it is easier to control and manage. Laboratory users can
be set to map secure areas of ﬁleservers that have backup/
restore systems. Laboratory software packages can be
conﬁgured (automatically or procedurally) to save data
directly to this secure network area.
This secure area can have Windows NT Security
Auditing set-up (assuming that this is your server oper-
ating systems) to capture the date, time and login ID
whenever ﬁles are created, modiﬁed, accessed or deleted
within the secure area. If this audit trail is examined, it
can tell when a ﬁle is deleted, which allows for retrieval
from backup tape.
Issues to solve
While this schema does provide an audit tail and does
allow for the retrieval of modiﬁed or deleted data,
the main issue is how to read the audit trail. Due to
the low-level nature of the Windows NT security log, the
entries are very lengthy and diﬃcult to interpret. The
creation of a single ﬁle and its deletion occupies eight
pages of log. Here is the ﬁnal page of the log for such an
action:
6/20/2002, 1:13:44 PM, Security, Success Audit,
Object Access, 562, NT
AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, DATASERVER, Handle
Closed:
Object Server: Security
Handle ID: 2408
Process ID: 2163827264
6/20/2002, 1:13:44 PM, Security, Success Audit,
Object Access, 564, NT
AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, DATASERVER, Object
Deleted:
Object Server: Security
Handle ID: 2408
Process ID: 2163827264
6/20/2002,1:13:44 PM, Security, Success Audit,
Object Access, 560, S-1-5-21-823792125-1069754216-
1537874043-1103, DATASERVER, Object Open:
Object Server: Security
Object Type: File
Object Name: E:\Data\RawQC\QC-
WKST-01 \script5.#01
New Handle ID: 2408
Operation ID: {0,507671965}
Process ID: 2163827264
Primary User Name: SYSTEM
Primary Domain: NT AUTHORITY
Primary Logon ID: (0x0,0x3E7)
Client User Name: user_test
Client Domain: LAB-DOMAIN
Client Logon ID: (0x0,0x1E426FD5)
Accesses DELETE
Privileges –
6/20/2002,1:13:44 PM, Security, Success Audit, Object
Access, 562, NT
AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, DATASERVER, Handle
Closed:
Object Server: Security
Handle ID: 1380
Process ID: 2163827264
While all of the critical information is in the log, an
average day’s log runs 20000–30000 pages and is not
human readable.
Solutions
The solution to the impenetrable log is to write a ﬁltering
program to parse the log into human-readable format.
The ideal language for ﬁltering large text ﬁles is perl
(practical extraction and report language). Once a perl
ﬁlter script is written, it can read the comma delimited
Windows NT Security log, ﬁlter the log and output into
Excel. This ﬁlter can then be validated to discover what a
ﬁle creation and a ﬁle deletion looks like in the log for
each instrument software package.
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controls that require the following:
. Frequent backup of the secure raw data store.
. Collection and processing of the log.
. Review of the ﬁltered log for the presence of
overwrites or deletions before backup tapes are
recycled.
. If overwrites or deletions are detected, restora-
tion of ﬁles from tape and investigation into the
occurrence.
There also need to be instrument procedural controls
that mandate the following:
. User logins are user speciﬁc and that use of another
user’s login is prohibited.
. Modiﬁcation or deletion of raw data is prohibited.
. Data systems have audit trails in place that track
user identiﬁcation, date and time.
. Use of password-protected screen savers is
required.
. Initiation of data collection during network failure
is prohibited (no audit trail running).
. What to do if network failure occurs during data
collection (depends on the software package).
Summary
There are still the following issues to address with the
system:
. If a ﬁle is created and then modiﬁed/deleted before
the server is backed up, then that version is lost (the
log will capture the creation and the modiﬁcation/
deletion event, but the data will be lost).
. Filter development and validation is an iterative
process that is time consuming.
. Investigations are diﬃcult and frequently have
false-positives as the root cause.
. Deployment and management of the system
require agreement and cooperation of IT, QC and
Validation to be successful.
While this alternative solution is far from perfect, it has
the strong beneﬁt of using standard IT tools (servers,
networks and operating systems) that are understood and
usually already exist in-house. The software development
eﬀort to write the ﬁlter script is small and the resulting
code is short and straightforward to explain to inspectors.
When coupled with enhanced procedural controls, this
solution provides an acceptable level of compliance at
extremely low cost.
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